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Background. The first steps ( phase 1) toward laboratory containment of poliovirus after eradication are a national survey of biomedical facilities and a global inventory of such facilities retaining wild poliovirus (WPV) infectious and potentially infectious materials.
Methods. We reviewed published reports on national laboratory surveys and inventories of WPV materials from each of the 3 polio-free World Health Organization (WHO) regions (the European Region, completed in 2006; the Western Pacific Region, completed in 2008; and the Region of the Americas, completed in 2010), as well as reports on progress in polio-free countries of the remaining 3 regions (the African Region, the Eastern Mediterranean Region, and the WHO South-East Asia Region).
Results. Containment phase 1 activities are complete in 154 of 194 WHO Member States (79%), including all countries and areas of the polio-free regions and most polio-free countries in the remaining 3 regions. A reported 227 209 biomedical facilities were surveyed, with 532 facilities in 45 countries identified as retaining WPV-associated infectious or potentially infectious materials.
Conclusions. Completion of containment phase 1 global activities is achievable within the time frame set by the Polio Eradication and Endgame Strategic Plan 2013-2018.
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Laboratory containment of wild poliovirus (WPV) was established by the Global Commission for the Certification of the Eradication of Poliomyelitis (GCC) in 1995 as a requirement for certification of polio eradication [1] . In 1999, the World Health Organization (WHO) published the first Global Action Plan for Laboratory Containment of Wild Polioviruses [2] . That same year, the World Health Assembly urged WHO Member States to begin the process leading to containment [3] . In 2004, a second, interim edition of the global action plan was published incorporating new information on circulating vaccine-derived polioviruses (cVDPV) and evolving posteradication vaccination policies [4] . Posteradication biosafety guidelines were made available for manufacturers of Salk inactivated poliovirus vaccines (IPVs) [5] . In 2009, an updated, third edition of the global action plan (GAPIII) was posted on the WHO Web site and remains open as a draft for public comment [6] .
The basic poliovirus containment strategy is to minimize poliovirus-facility-associated transmission through risk elimination and risk management. The posteradication risk of WPV transmission from facilities is eliminated through destruction of infectious virus and potentially infectious clinical materials. Once use of oral polio vaccine (OPV) ceases, the risk of vaccine-derived polio will be eliminated through destruction of OPV and related virus materials. Exceptions would be limited to a small number of facilities (<20) serving essential posteradication functions, including vaccine production and quality assurance, OPV stockpile maintenance, diagnostic nonviable reagent production, virus reference activities, or critical research. Risk is managed in these essential facilities by safeguards of strict biocontainment and by locating facilities in areas with high population immunity and low transmission potential.
Poliovirus containment is implemented in 4 phases [6] . The first phase is a national survey of biomedical facilities (laboratories) and WPV inventory, which provides the facilities databases for all subsequent steps toward eliminating the risk of facilityassociated poliovirus transmission. The second phase promulgates national long-term poliovirus policy and regulations and establishes national regulatory structures. The third phase is global destruction or containment of WPV materials within 6 months after 1 year has passed without isolation of WPV worldwide. The fourth phase is global destruction or containment of OPV materials at the time routine use of OPV ceases.
Poliovirus endgame strategies and containment planning have evolved over the past 15 years, but unchanged has been the basic concept of a containment process that begins with a global survey of biomedical facilities and compilation of a WPV inventory. In this report, we describe progress on national and regional surveys and inventories and discuss further actions required to achieve global poliovirus containment.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
We reviewed published reports of national laboratory inventories for WPV containment in the European Region (completed in 2006) [7] , the Western Pacific Region (completed in 2008) [8] , and the Region of the Americas (completed in 2010 [9] ), as well as progress in the polio-free countries of the remaining 3 regions (the African Region, the Eastern Mediterranean Region, and the South-East Asia Region). National surveys were guided by WHO recommendations published in the first edition of the global action plan, but specific strategies to establish a national database of laboratories and biomedical institutions varied according to economic, administrative, and health infrastructure development. Because few countries have databases that include all biomedical facilities, countries used existing laboratory regulations/laws and databases to develop the initial lists of biomedical laboratories while consolidating and verifying lists from laboratory registries, accrediting bodies, professional organizations and associations, national and institutional biosafety networks, and relevant ministries. In China, for example, the survey was coordinated across 48 different ministries. Final facility databases included hospitals, public and private clinical laboratories, universities, research institutions, military facilities, environmental agencies, biotech and pharmaceutical companies, Ministry of Health, and other government laboratories. Searches of the scientific literature, phone books, the Internet, and purchased lists were used to supplement and verify information from facility databases.
Experience in the European Region led to the subsequent triage of public and private biomedical facilities as being of high, medium, or low risk of retaining infectious or potentially infectious WPV materials. Risk was based on the nature of past and present facility functions and frozen storage potential. High risk included Salk vaccine production, virology/infectious diseases research or teaching, and public-health laboratory facilities. Medium risk included environmental, large hospital, industrial, and clinical facilities with advanced microbiological capabilities. Low risk included basic public or private clinical or other biomedical facilities with limited microbiological activities. Most national surveys excluded low-risk facilities that had no capacity for long-term storage of clinical materials (unreliable electricity supply or absence of freezers) or that were subject to national regulations prohibiting storage of such materials beyond a specified time.
Survey methods consisted of sending each facility on the database 1 or more letters and a questionnaire from the national minister of health, the chairperson of the national containment committee or the national certification committee (NCC), or a designated senior official. The standard questionnaire requested information on laboratory activities, freezer storage capacities, and holdings of WPV-or cVDPV-associated infectious and potentially infectious materials. Failure to respond within the deadlines triggered follow-up phone calls, written notifications, on-site visits, or delivery of surveys by private courier. Members of the task force and independent reviewers sometimes visited a sample of high-risk facilities to validate survey responses.
Based on findings from early surveys that no WPV materials were to be found among the large numbers of facilities considered low risk, regional certification commissions (RCCs) in the Western Pacific Region and the Region of the Americas recommended that subsequent phase I activities need only survey a percentage (>10%) of low-risk facilities to verify risk assumptions. Complete replies from all high-and medium-risk facilities were a requirement in the final national report to the NCC and documentation of phase I quality. In the European Region, 25 countries reported 265 facilities retaining WPV materials. The highest numbers were in the United Kingdom (103 facilities), followed by France (56), Germany (22), and Switzerland (13) . Thirteen countries reported ≤2 facilities retaining WPV materials. Universities constituted the highest percentage of institutions retaining such materials, followed by public health institutions and hospitals.
RESULTS

Containment phase 1 activities are complete in all Member
In the Western Pacific Region, 4 countries reported 45 facilities retaining WPV infectious materials (2 in Australia, 27 in China, 15 in Japan, and 1 in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea). Of the 45 facilities retaining WPV materials, 27 are participants in the Global Polio Laboratory Network (25 in China, 1 in Australia, and 1 in Japan).
In the Region of the Americas, 9 countries reported a total of 215 facilities retaining WPV infectious materials: the United States (180 facilities), Canada (8), Brazil (6), Costa Rica (6), Argentina (5), Mexico (4), Guatemala (3), Chile (2), and Trinidad and Tobago (1).
Overall, country surveys of low-risk facilities (eg, small public and private diagnostic laboratories) in all 3 regions ranged from 10% to 100%, with the majority of countries exceeding the RCC recommendations. In the Region of the Americas, for example, 81.5% of 44 077 low-risk facilities were surveyed. No low-risk facilities were identified by any country as holding WPV materials.
All 3 polio-free regions reported verbal and documented incidents of voluntary reductions in the number of facilities retaining WPV materials. Colombia, Cuba, and Panama destroyed all such materials. The Western Pacific Region reported a reduction in the number of facilities retaining WPV from 147 facilities in 1999 to 45 in 2008. In the European Region, 26 facilities in 21 countries reported destroying all previously retained WPV materials.
In the regions not yet certified as free of polio, phase I is reported complete in all countries except for those where polio is endemic or there is a high risk of repeated poliovirus importation and outbreaks (eg, countries of West Africa). As in the polio-free regions, the phase I process in the polio-endemic regions involved extensive surveys of biomedical facilities and identification of facilities with WPV materials. In both the Eastern Mediterranean Region and the South-East Asia Region, countries completing phase I have destroyed identified materials. The 2 facilities in the Eastern Mediterranean Region retaining WPV materials are members of the Global Polio Laboratory Network. Additional facilities are likely to be identified in these 2 regions when phase I activities are completed in Afghanistan, India, and Pakistan. In the African Region, efforts to complete phase I are focused on countries of southern Africa and will then pivot to the rest of the region and Nigeria when WPV transmission is interrupted.
DISCUSSION
Full implementation of GAPIII greatly reduces the risk of inadvertent transmission of poliovirus from a poliovirus facility to the community after WPV eradication and OPV cessation [10] [11] [12] . The consequences of a facility-associated transmission are also reduced by the planned posteradication replacement of OPV with IPV and by continued global immunization. However, over time, the potential consequences of transmission will grow if countries begin to lose interest in long-term IPV immunization against a disease that no longer exists. A facilityassociated reintroduction of polioviruses into increasingly unprotected populations could have serious disease consequences and major financial implications. The phase 1 survey and inventory is complete for the 3 certified polio-free regions, with a fourth (the South-East Asia Region) expected to soon follow. Beginning with the Western Pacific Region in 1999, implementation of phase I in each subsequent region greatly benefitted from the pioneering experiences of the other regions, as evidenced by increased survey efficiency and country confidence in the outcome. Independent review panels and RCCs in each of the 3 polio-free regions verified the quality of surveys and inventories by Member States to meet or exceed WHO requirements.
Confidence in survey strategies is strengthened by the findings that WPV infectious and potentially infectious materials were found in facilities considered as being at risk of holding such materials. The large numbers of small diagnostic laboratories classified as low risk were found to present no risk.
Phase I offered countries, many for the first time, the opportunity to establish a national integrated database of biomedical facilities. In the Region of the Americas, 6 countries (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, and Peru) established national registries that could be used beyond the goal of poliovirus containment. Canada included polioviruses into its Human Pathogens and Toxins Act of 2009 and confirmed its 2002-2004 phase I national laboratory database and survey results. Successful application of this model act to control and track polioviruses and other infectious agents supports the use of a regulatory or legislative strategy as an effective approach to be taken by other countries in subsequent containment phases.
However, it should be noted that the survey and inventory process has certain inherent limitations. First, it cannot be stated with certainty that all facilities were included in the survey, even with participation of all relevant national sectors and independent reviews at both the national and regional levels. Even if all facilities were included, they may not have correctly identified qualifying infectious or potentially infectious materials. Even if these materials were correctly identified, there is always the question of virus stocks or clinical materials being improperly labeled or even contaminated with polioviruses [13] . Phase 1 represents the initial effort to inform all biomedical facilities of plans for poliovirus containment, encourage destruction of WPV materials, and build national databases. Full implementation of containment includes ≥2 subsequent steps ( phases) with additional opportunities for countries to refine national databases, disseminate regulations, verify facility reports, and inform the greater laboratory community of compliance expectations.
Second, the total of 227 209 facilities provides only a sense of magnitude of the survey effort, as the term "facility" may apply equally to a small laboratory, which in itself is difficult to define, or to a large institution having multiple laboratories. All countries listed clinical diagnostic laboratories as single facilities, irrespective of size, but most industrialized countries with complex administrative laboratory infrastructures also listed universities, governmental agencies, and vaccine producers as single facilities, regardless of the number of laboratory units surveyed. The rationale being that institutions and agencies are accountable for compliance of the multiple, and often highly fluid, numbers of laboratories under their jurisdictions.
Third is the issue of elapsed time. Many surveys in the 3 poliofree regions were initially completed as early as 2001. Although updated for the final regional phase 1 reports with annual updates requested by the RCC, time remains a factor. After >10 years, national infrastructures change, facilities and functions change, investigators move to other projects, national survey officials change, and institutional memories fade. Because of the potential for lengthy containment time lines, each country report was required to include the name and location of the office responsible for maintaining survey and inventory records in both electronic and hard copy. Some countries completing phase I early must anticipate the coming challenge of drastically updating databases to implement subsequent containment steps.
What remains to be done to complete phase 1 globally? Countries in the 3 polio-free regions must resubmit reports to the RCC in the event of WPV importation. Countries reporting completion of phase 1 in the 3 regions not yet free of polio must undergo final RCC verification. Forty countries remain to complete phase I laboratory survey and inventory activities. In the WHO South-East Asia Region, phase I activities are underway in India, the only remaining state. In the Eastern Mediterranean Region, only Afghanistan and Pakistan remain, awaiting WPV elimination. Most countries needing to complete phase I are in sub-Saharan Africa. Once WPV is eliminated, phase 1 in the African region should progress relatively well because few countries are likely to possess a substantial number of facilities at risk of retaining WPV materials.
At the time of OPV type 2 cessation (with the switch from trivalent to bivalent OPV), safe-handling requirements will be increased for all Sabin type 2 polioviruses in advance of full containment. Nonessential facilities on the global inventory will be urged to begin destruction of all WPV. Following confirmation that WPV transmission has been interrupted for 1 year, appropriate national legislation and/or regulation will need to be in place in all countries to ensure completion of WPV destruction or containment within 6 months [6] . At that time, essential facilities with WPV will implement primary safeguards (good facility design and management), secondary safeguards (location of essential facilities in areas with high levels of immunity), and tertiary safeguards (location in areas with good personal, domestic, and environmental hygiene standards). Essential facilities with only OPV materials after cessation of OPV in routine immunization will be expected to meet primary and secondary safeguards.
The goal of the Polio Eradication and Endgame Strategic Plan 2013-2018 [14] is to certify the eradication and containment of all WPVs by the end of 2018, which will require adoption of a containment policy by the World Health Assembly as part of the comprehensive posteradication endgame strategy, possibly as early as 2015. We believe this goal is achievable, but it will require a revision of the current GAPIII draft that is consistent with the proposed accelerated OPV type 2 cessation time line and global access to IPV. Also to be finalized is the process for reaching international agreement on numbers and locations of essential poliovirus facilities and establishing a system for national and international accreditation of such facilities.
